Lately, I’ve been reading a lot about the battle of
Marengo. It’s a fascinating, if baffling, subject: several crucial aspects of
the battle are very different in all reports I’ve found, including first-hand
accounts. On top of that, when reading primary sources, one has to wade through
several layers of self-aggrandizing revisionism by First Consul Bonaparte,
complacent revisionism by his clients, and scornful revisionism by officers who
deemed their achievements deserved greater rewards.
After deciding (somewhat arbitrarily, of course) which
sources are most reliable, it’s possible to start putting all the pieces together.
And the truth slowly emerges: what goes under the moniker “Battle of Marengo”
is in fact a long, tragicomic series of SNAFUs and blunders by both sides over
the course of at least two days.
In his fantastic blog “Obscure Battles”, Mr. Jeff
Berry provides a very colourful and eminently enjoyable AAR:
Obscure Battles: Marengo 1800
The online magazine “War Times Journal” has a very
nice page on Marengo which includes several primary documents:
The Battle of Marengo (wtj.com)
There are of course countless more reports and webpages
devoted to Marengo, I’ll just link a few more among those most useful to
wargamers here:
Battle of Marengo (frenchempire.net)
Jean Lannes » Marengo
Journal de voyage du Général Desaix,
Suisse et Italie (1797) : Louis Charles Antoine Desaix de Veygoux ,
Louis-Charles-Antoine Desaix, Arthur Maxime Chuquet, Arthur Chuquet , Arthur
Maxime, 1853 -1925 Chuquet : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet
Archive
Speaking of wargames, there are several published
wargames on Marengo; my favourite ones are those (the fact that both use blocks
is probably not a coincidence):
Battle of Marengo | Command Post Games
Bonaparte at Marengo | Board Game |
BoardGameGeek
…but reading primary sources left me with a desire to
experiment further with alternate course of actions and “what-ifs”. The
simplest thing would probably be to modify Pub Battles’ Marengo official scenario
and terrain rules to make both closer to primary sources. However, I’m a total
rule nerd and I really enjoy designing simple wargames, so I started to reconsider
everything from scratch instead. My vague design attempts quickly took a very
specific direction: I wanted to jot down the simplest, fastest possible set of
rules which would still give a broad picture of the tactical situation and
Marengo. A logical place to start was thus the (arguably) simplest wargame I
ever played: Neil Thomas’ One-Hour Wargames.
One‑Hour
Wargames Marengo?
Is it at all reasonable to expect OHW to be able to
model a ‘real’ battle like Marengo? Well, let me start with a categorical
syllogism.
Major premise:
Neil Thomas’ One-Hour Wargames, rules-as-written (RAW), give simple - but fun -
Horse & Musket games focusing on small tactical exercises (scenarios)
involving a handful of units. There’s a surprising tactical depth to be found
in play, and the overall narrative is strikingly similar to what more ‘serious’
rulesets model given the same situation.
Minor
premise: Realistic battlefield situations/historical scenarios
can be regarded as the sum of many simultaneous, smaller tactical exercises
similar to OHW’s scenarios.
Conclusion: It
should be possible to play historical scenarios/full battles with OHW.
…however, after trying to condense the Marengo situation
into a typical OHW scenario, I’ve found the result was so bland and generic as
to feel utterly disconnected from the original historical event. There’s a
number of problems involved in using historical OOBs with the RAW; so I wrote a
set of amendments, which I’m currently playtesting with an ad-hoc created
Marengo scenario. They seem to work! In this series of posts, I’ll dissect what
I amended, how and why. At the end of the series, I’ll compile all the amended
rules into a coherent (I hope) document.
Let’s start!
Step 1: Start
with a great map.
Given my Kriegsspiel-inspired, map-and-blocks
obsession, Marengo is a great choice: there’s a wonderful historical map
available on the web – one of the very rare ones which doesn’t show troop
positions and can be thus played upon without any kind of image processing.
It’s the same map Command Post Games used as the basis for their Marengo game,
and you can consult a copy at Simmons Games [edited to add - unfortunately their website seems to be down since a few weeks, I hope everything is fine]:
The map is wonderful,
but it has a few quirks if you study it carefully enough.
For example, most people first playing Command Post
Games’ Marengo are driven mad by the fact that there seems to be a major alley
on both sides of the Bormida between Cascina Bianca and La Moglia – but apparently, no bridge or ford. Conversely, there
seems to be some sort of crossing marked out near Montecastello across the Tanaro
– but there’s no mention of such in historical accounts, and it would
definitely be a bizarre omission given that it would definitely have mattered.
Moreover, the vexed question about the (alleged?) other bridge used by Ott’s division gets
no clear answer on this map. Austrians infamously had a pontoon bridge
established on June 13th somewhere downstream (North) of Alessandria, and First Consul Bonaparte
assigned Colonel Lauriston with the task to destroy it. Later that evening
however, the officer admittedly reported to him that the order proved
impossible to fulfil due to staunch Austrian resistance. The problem is,
Napoleon later would claim he wasn’t informed about this by anyone, and assumed
the bridge was positively destroyed when formulating the plan on the next day –
this could explain his famous, subsequent judgement blunder…
Except it doesn’t. Reports are vague and discordant,
but if the pontoon bridge was still there on June 14th, then it
didn’t play a large part in the battle. And it would be strange for it to be
still there, given that it took Ott’s wing so long to cross the Bormida. In
fact, there’s a direct mention of the pontoon bridge being unanchored and
floated next to the permanent bridge at Alessandria
in one of the sources… which also
seems strange, given that Austrians would have needed to drag it against the
river’s flow. Or is the mysterious dashed line at Montecastello the pontoon’s final position on June 14th?
Nobody knows, apparently. As with everything regarding Marengo, all of the
above is just an educated guess. Some of the reports contain the same overall
narrative regarding – not this extra pontoon bridge – but the main bridgehead
in front of Alessandria. We’ll never know who’s right, I’m afraid.
It’s easy to criticize Bonaparte for his initial
battleplan at Marengo (or rather, the absence of one). But, as it often happens
throughout history, most great military commanders’ plans which hindsight
exposed as ‘bad’ did in fact make perfect sense at the time of their
formulation (including Cannae, but I’ll leave that one for another time). In
this case, just imagine French commanders trying to drive Austrians off
Marengo, late afternoon June 13th. Then suddenly Austrians evacuate
the fortified farm and retreat – not to their tete-de-ponte, but all the
way into Alessandria, across the river. French troopers only stopped
pursuing the retreating Austrians when coming into the sights of no less than
two full artillery batteries, finally taking positions in the Pedrabona/Pietra Buona farm.
French high command reasoned that the only rational
explanation for the Austrians’ course of action was that they had received
orders to relocate somewhere else… but in fact, it was a C&C blunder: they were ordered to hold the tete-de-ponte at
all costs on June 13th evening! This proved to be a (totally
involuntary, but incredibly effective) feint which caught Napoleon completely
off-guard on the next day.
The 71-years old Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Michael
Friedrich Benedikt Baron von Melas, instead ordered the just-retreated troops
to cross the river again in the dead of night – and to do so without lighting
any fire so as not to alarm French vedettes.
However, there apparently were serious problems in moving such a large number
of troopers across the single (?) bridge on the Bormida, and the first morning lights saw only a small portion of
Melas’ infantry having formed on the far side of the river.
What I’m trying to demonstrate here is that Marengo
wasn’t at all a straight and fair pitched battle, or a contest between high
military geniuses at their best. Rather, it was the result of several judgment
errors, communication failures, improvisation and blind luck (or lack thereof)
on both sides. Due to this, I doubt that any ‘classic’ tabletop wargame,
however detailed, could model the whole situation in any meaningful – let alone
entertaining – way. I wager something like Engle Matrix or open Kriegsspiel
(both requiring an umpire and involving hidden information, random events and
roleplaying elements) would probably get much closer to what commanders really
experienced on that June 14th of almost exactly 221 years ago.
In contrast, my OHW-based Marengo game will have all
the details sorted in advance, and there will be no piece of information hidden
to the players or determined randomly at the start of the battle. For example,
there will be only one bridge in play – that is, the one at Alessandria. This
seems to keep outcomes more closely in line with historical reports.
One might ask however, is it realistic to expect such
a simple ruleset as OHW to be able to model anything
at all regarding a historical battle? My answer is yes: OHW can in my
opinion work as a simple, fast ‘toy model’ of a real battle – provided that you
feed it with real values in terms of effectives, space, and time. In that case,
I think it should be able to represent a general idea of the situation, give a
rough assessment of the possible courses of action, and present players with
broad-brush, but historically relevant, choices.
One last point about the map: there are a number of
open issues regarding terrain and how it impacted on the battle’s evolution.
The wineyards were probably of a type that completely impeded cavalry movements
along the W-E axis. The Fontanone’s banks were soft and swampy from recent
showers and rendered the single bridge at Marengo a lot more important than one
might think at first glance. The ground itself wasn’t as billiard-pool-flat as it’s
today, after 80 years of mechanised agriculture. All of these issues will be
considered in a future post; for the moment, I’m only interested in the general
size and shape of the battlefield.
Step 2 –
Orders of Battle and how to represent them (size does matter).
The next step is to find historical OOBs and to
convert it into OHW units. I’m not interested in details and troop types yet –
I only want to get an idea of force/space ratios, frontages, etc… which
immediately brings to the fore the issue of scale and a ton of practical issues
I’ll elaborate on later. Let me explain. Marengo is not a large battle by
Napoleonic standards, with around 30k combatants per side. The one reproduced
below is a typical XIX century situation map for the battle – there are many of
them available online. Judging from their frontages (and their number), those
tiny rectangles must be regiments, or demi-brigades, or huge battalions, or any
formal classification for a total of around 1500-2500 foot soldiers or around a
third that many mounted troopers. It seems to make sense to have these as the
actual playing pieces in our wargame.
With around 60000 soldiers in the battle, it’s easy to
see how this is not a viable approach. We need to increase the represented
effectives by around 400%, and – consequently – to reduce musketry and
artillery ranges by the same token. But I’ll leave the mechanical amendments to
movement and firing ranges to a future post; for the moment, let’s just define
the size of the ‘chunks’ we’ll divide each army into, both in terms of
effectives and actual measures on the table.
As a preliminary consideration, I’ll note that OHW
uses inches for all measurements, but it’s trivial to instead use any other
unit of measure to scale down (or up) the physical representation of the game
on the table, with centimetres being a popular option for ‘pocked-sized’ games.
I’ll continue to express all measurements in inches to remain compatible with
the RAW, but I’m really meaning generic “OHW length units” instead. I already
know for sure that I won’t use actual inches, since at 6” per regiment I’d need
half a tennis court to play even on my cropped Marengo map. My amendments will
be based on the following sizes/frontages/ranges assumptions:
·
The average frontage occupied by one
soldier in a formed infantry unit is assumed to be around 50-60cm
·
The average frontage occupied by one
cavalryman in line is assumed to be around 100-120cm
·
Effective musketry range is assumed
to be 125m - a broad generalization to include fog of war, inaccuracy… but also
the often overlooked fact that even a 5% hit rate is already devastating if you think about it!
·
Skirmishers/sharpshooters are assumed
to deploy around 250-300m forward of their parent units, and their shooting to
have a longer effective range than massed infantry’s. Due to this, they can
start to engage enemies at around 500m forward of a massed infantry unit’s
position.
·
Effective artillery range is assumed
to be 1000m, extended to 1500m due to bounce in appropriate terrain.
·
Line infantry units will represent a
demi-brigade, regiment, huge battalion or equivalent formation comprising
around 1500-2500 troopers. Light infantry units represent around half that
number, cavalry more like one third, while artillery units represent around two
batteries with accompanying caissons, infantry and horses.
All things considered then, I will use a scale of 3 “OHW units” (inches in the RAW) = 125m
(or around 65 toises if you are an
history nerd like me). This equates to all
units having a frontage of 250m.
It’s important to note that, given the above figures,
not all of the effectives in a given unit are assumed to be always lined up in a
continuous line. The standard 6” frontage of units is intended to represent the
space occupied by e.g. a couple of infantry battalions deployed either in line (side
by side), or in more compact formations interspersed with the open space
necessary to maneuver them effectively. For simplicity’s sake, frontage remains
the same for all (implicit) combat formations including ordre mixte and attack columns; columns of route will be
represented differently (more on this in a future post).
Formations will not be explicitly represented. It's
assumed that officers are constantly trying to keep their men in the most tactically
sensible formations; their varying degree of success in doing so is represented
by their – and the enemy’s – attack rolls. Regarding line infantry in
particular, the assumption is that most of the movement represented on the
table is done in some form of columnar formation, e.g. by grand division.
Column of route by half company or even narrower are instead assumed for road
movement. Infantry units are assumed to deploy into line as part of their
firing action (which, as in the RAW, cannot be combined with ‘standard’
movement).
What about units depths then? Well, there are some
surprises. The depth of a cavalry unit in 2 ranks is around 6m, and that of a
massed infantry unit in 3 ranks less than 2m – both of which are vanishingly
small on this scale, corresponding to something like 0,2 inches assuming a 6”
frontage! This is practically impossible to represent on the table, even if
using the thinnest blocks/counters (let alone miniature bases…). However, as I
said above, units are not always assumed to be fully lined up, and infantry in
particular will have progressively deeper formations when deployed in ordre
mixte, column of grand divisions, column by company, etc… According to this, I will
use a default depth of around 50m to accommodate for most non-route formations
and/or the space all regiments in successive lines would avoid not to hinder
frontliners’ maneuvers. Columns of route, being often 4-8 men walking astride,
were basically a line moving sideways, and they will be represented as such (details
will follow in a future post).
Artillery is something of a surprise, though. The
depth of an artillery battery including reserve caissons was something like 150-200m! This corresponds to a depth
of around 4” in OHW terms, which starts to be both non-negligible and
practically feasible to be represented on table.
Putting it
all together
So that’s what we have so far, in OHW’s native length units
(inches):
Unit Type |
Avg. effectives |
Frontage |
Depth |
Formed infantry |
2000 |
6” |
≈ 1” |
Light infantry |
1000 |
6” |
≈ 1” |
Cavalry |
750 |
6” |
≈ 1” |
Artillery |
≈ 16 guns |
6” |
4” |
This is already starting to look like the real thing! One non-trivial issue
remains, though: in OHW scale (inches), the map above is exactly 160x160”, an
unpractical size for (most?) dining room tables. The trivial solution is of
course to reduce the physical footprint of units – that is, making one “OHW
unit” to correspond to something smaller than 1”. Centimetres are still not
small enough – printing a 160x160 cm map isn’t exactly trivial. Using 1 OHW
inch = half a cm is doable, requiring a perfectly reasonable 80x80 cm map and
units with a frontage of 3 cm. Myself, I’ve decided to go as small as
practically possible, which I’ve found to be only a tad smaller: my blocks will
have 2.5 cm wide frontages and my map will be around the size of a typical DBA
mat.
In the next post, I will detail my amendments to OHW
on the crucial issue of movement and terrain.
The West Point Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars maintains that the pontoon bridge was floated upstream into the tete du pont. The stream was sluggish, so this was no great feat. But the tete du pont had only one gate, so troops crossing the extra bridge still had to wait until other troops cleared the single gate.
ReplyDeleteLooking forward to seeing more of this. Marengo is one of my favorites.
Thanks for your comment. I agree the 'two bridges, one gate' option seems the most convincing - if anything, because it doesn't make sense, much like most of what Melas and Bonaparte did on that day. BTW, the map I'm using seems to show exactly that if you zoom on the tete-de-pont: two bridges next to each other, and just one opening in the TdP barricade.
ReplyDeleteOften, the victor is not the one with the best plan but the one who makes fewer and less critical mistakes.
ReplyDelete